Pakistan: China’s pawn in the Middle East? : How Beijing ‘uses’ Pakistan to sell weapons

Understanding how Pakistan helps China in its weapons trade

A profound shift is occurring in Middle Eastern security, largely out of the spotlight. Following the September 2025 strategic mutual defense pact between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, an agreement where an attack on one is considered an attack on both, Pakistan immediately deployed JF-17 fighter jets, troops, and defense assets to the Kingdom. This deployment, triggered by a recent US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding, was not just a show of Pakistani support. It was a live-fire demonstration of Chinese military hardware on Arabian soil.Pakistan has transformed into China’s primary gateway for military expansion into the Middle East. Rather than selling weapons directly, Beijing uses Islamabad as a “white-label” promoter, leveraging Pakistan’s deep ties with Gulf states to push Chinese defense systems into a region historically dominated by the West.

The gateway strategy

China is actively using Pakistan to broker deals for the JF-17 fighter jet, HQ-9 air defense systems, and armed drones to a sprawling list of nations, including Iraq, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Morocco, Libya, Bangladesh, Sudan, and Ethiopia.Pakistan serves as a crucial middleman, shielding China from geopolitical friction. A prime example is the recent $4 billion defense deal where Pakistan supplied 16 JF-17s and training aircraft to the Libyan National Army. This arrangement allowed China to drastically shift the military balance in Libya and expand its footprint while Pakistan absorbed the potential international backlash — critics have pointed to the arrangement potentially undermining the UN arms embargo on Libya, escalating the country’s internal conflict by shifting the military balance, raising questions over the legitimacy of the LNA as a recipient, and intensifying broader geopolitical tensions in an already fragmented regional security environment.Not every proposed deal has landed, though. One reported arrangement would have seen Pakistan supply JF-17s to Saudi Arabia in exchange for financial arrangements, including a $2 billion loan extended by Riyadh to Islamabad. That deal has not materialized, largely due to concerns over the quality of Chinese weapons, interoperability with Saudi Arabia’s existing US-origin systems, and broader financial considerations.Despite aggressive promotion, Gulf states have hesitated to buy Chinese systems outright, citing those same concerns over quality, interoperability, and financing. However, as Gulf countries reassess their security priorities and their confidence in American protection wanes, Pakistan’s role as a trusted broker becomes invaluable.

The ‘Threshold Alliance’

To understand how Pakistan became this gateway, one must look at the sheer depth of its own military integration with China. A landmark USIP report characterises this not as a standard partnership, but as a “threshold alliance,” meaning the material and technical conditions for joint wartime operations are already in place.According to SIPRI, over 80% of Pakistan’s arms imports between 2021 and 2024 came from China. Today, the Pakistan Air Force fields six squadrons of Chinese JF-17s and J-10s compared to just three squadrons of American F-16s — and Pakistan does still operate those American platforms, occasionally receiving US military assistance alongside its deepening Chinese ties. Furthermore, Pakistan’s conventional strike missiles rely entirely on China’s BeiDou navigation satellite system — the same system used by the Chinese military.Building on this foundation: this saturation does more than arm Pakistan; it inextricably links Islamabad’s logistics, maintenance, and supply chains to Beijing. Because Pakistan’s military is essentially a fully integrated Chinese ecosystem, they possess the unique operational credibility to convince Gulf states that Chinese weapons are not just cheap alternatives, but viable, battle-ready platforms. China has reinforced this narrative aggressively, leveraging extensive propaganda about the supposed success of the JF-17 and other Chinese platforms during the May 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan as a live marketing case study for the region.

The Pakistani army as the architect

Translating hardware sales into actual regional security integration requires doctrine, and this is where the Pakistani military is quietly doing the heavy lifting. Following the appointment of Army Chief General Asim Munir in late 2022, widely viewed as backed by Beijing, his immediate visits to Riyadh and the UAE firmly placed Sino-Pakistani defense integration at the top of the Gulf’s agenda.The Pakistani army is currently fulfilling vital functions for China in the Middle East:1. It runs intensive exercises with China (like the unscripted Shaheen air drills) and separate exercises with Saudi Arabia (like Al-Kasih). They are actively developing hybrid military protocols that blend Eastern and Western tactics, allowing Gulf forces to adopt Chinese tech without abandoning their existing command structures.2. Under Pakistani guidance, Gulf militaries are test-flying Chinese jets. During Qatar’s Zelzal-2 exercise, Pakistani pilots flew J-10Cs and JF-17s against Western systems, providing Gulf states with an unbiased assessment of Chinese capabilities.3. Islamabad acts as an informal channel, aligning the threat perceptions of Beijing and the Gulf states regarding the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea.Ultimately, this weapons promotion serves a larger strategic architecture. Underpinning this alliance is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the strategic port of Gwadar. By securing this corridor, China gains a direct outlet to the Arabian Sea, bypassing the vulnerable US-patrolled Strait of Malacca. The Pakistani military provides the security for this infrastructure, while simultaneously facilitating Chinese naval access to the Gulf under the guise of securing trade routes.Looking ahead, if the potential “Islamic NATO” that Pakistan and Turkey have discussed takes shape, China may see it as an augmented market for its weapons systems. And in the aftermath of the US-Iran deal, some observers speculate China could move to flood Iran with weaponry as well, further integrating its zone of interoperable countries.What is emerging is not yet a formal “Islamic NATO,” but a highly functional, interoperable security network led from the shadows by Beijing. As discussions of a potential Chinese nuclear umbrella for this emerging axis circulate, the implications are clear. While the US focuses heavily on the Russia-China dynamic, the China-Pakistan threshold alliance is already rewriting the defense landscape of the Middle East, using Pakistani jets, Pakistani pilots, and Pakistani diplomacy to lock in Chinese hegemony over the Gulf.